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MAKING BALLOT INITIATIVES WORK: 
SOME ASSEMBLY REQUIRED 
For over one hundred years, the ballot initiative or proposition1 has 
been touted as a solution to some of the problems in the representative 
system of democracy in the United States.2  Depending on a state’s 
ballot initiative system, this mechanism enables citizens to make laws, 
to create or eliminate rights, or to amend the state’s constitution 
through a popular vote.  Popular initiatives were initially intended to 
allow ordinary citizens to intervene in the democratic process when 
their representative officials were not carrying out their wishes.3  
These proposition processes were supposed to “pour new meaning into 
the democratic experience” and to create a space for public delibera-
tion.4  Without such an opportunity, voters would be “caught up in a 
legislative strait jacket”; there could be “an ‘informed, civically mili-
tant electorate’ and ‘an aroused popular conscience,’” but the limited 
opportunities for participation would not allow that electorate to “sear 
‘the conscience of the people’s representatives.’”5 
By allowing the universe of eligible voters to cast their ballots di-
rectly on a matter, instead of relying on their elected representatives to 
consider, advocate, and vote on behalf of the voters, the ballot initia-
tive provides a more direct democracy.  With initiatives, each person 
can cast his or her own vote instead of relying on a perhaps-
unaccountable representative; thus, all eligible voters can participate 
in decisionmaking instead of only a select few.  Furthermore, broader 
participation serves as a potential check on tyranny.6  Finally, each 
person’s vote is counted equally, so no one has more influence because 
of status or other factors.   
However, even if propositions do assuage some of the problems of 
representation, a number of representative democracy’s deficiencies 
are, at their core, problems inherent in the electoral system.  These de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 The terms “ballot initiative” and “ballot proposition” are used interchangeably throughout 
this Note to signify systems by which an individual or group of people who are not necessarily 
elected officials can draft language and put it to a popular vote.  These terms are distinct from a 
state referendum, a process through which a state legislature may choose to put a measure on a 
ballot for a popular vote.  For a further description of mechanisms of direct democracy in the 
United States, see generally Marvin Krislov & Daniel M. Katz, Taking State Constitutions Se-
riously, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295 (2008). 
 2 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 160–61 (2004).   
 3 Id. at 161. 
 4 Id. at 163. 
 5 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 259 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring). 
 6 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (“[T]he 
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within 
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947285 
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ficiencies therefore also plague ballot initiatives and might in fact be 
compounded by initiatives.7  Decreasing the distance between individ-
uals and a decision by allowing the individuals to vote directly does 
not ensure that there will be meaningful deliberation.  Nor does it en-
sure that good public policy is likely to result from the decision, that 
those drafting, or voting on, the proposition have the necessary skills 
and information to be competent in those respective tasks, or that key 
segments of the population participate in the decision.  Because ballot 
initiatives, like elections, are an aggregative voting mechanism, ballot 
initiatives are in this respect “more machinery of the same kind as that 
which already exists.”8  It is counterproductive to attempt to fix the 
problems inherent in a majority-rule voting system by stressing voting 
systems and elections even more.  Addressing these problems likely re-
quires not that we increase the number of elections, but instead “that 
we stress elections less and supplement them with other forms of citi-
zen interaction.”9 
This Note discusses the feasibility of using citizens’ assemblies to 
improve the ballot initiative process.  Affirmative action ballot initia-
tives can serve as a good model for discussing the feasibility of this 
new approach to propositions,10 in part because the deficiencies of bal-
lot initiatives have been particularly notable in the area of affirmative 
action.  For more than a decade, groups in the affirmative action de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 With the increasing use of ballot initiatives, there has been much controversy over topics 
such as the limits — both substantive and procedural — that legislatures can or should impose on 
the ballot initiative process, see, e.g., John Gildersleeve, Note, Editing Direct Democracy: Does 
Limiting the Subject Matter of Ballot Initiatives Offend the First Amendment?, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1437 (2007), judicial review and deference regarding ballot initiative outcomes, see, e.g., Ju-
lian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1545 (1990); Mihui Pak, 
The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial Review of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 237, 253 (1999); Lori J. Rankin, Comment, Ballot Initiatives and Gay Rights: Equal 
Protection Challenges to the Right’s Campaign Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1055, 1079 (1994), and what types of groups benefit from or are disadvantaged by the avail-
ability of the mechanisms, see, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to 
Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978); see also JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY 
OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004).  
Scholars have proposed a number of different challenges to ballot initiatives.  These challenges 
range from calling for restrictions on, or modifications to, the initiative process or its substance, to 
calling for the elimination of ballot initiatives altogether.  See, e.g., Justin Henderson, Comment, 
The Tyranny of the Minority: Is It Time To Jettison Ballot Initiatives in Arizona?, 39 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 963 (2007). 
 8 JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 144 (Swallow Press & Ohio Univ. Press 
1991) (1927). 
 9 Jane Mansbridge, Adams Professor, Harvard Kennedy Sch., Keynote Address Before the 
Austrian Political Science Association: The Fallacy of Tightening the Reins 4 (Dec. 10, 2004) 
(transcript available at http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/intranet/poltheory/mansbridge.pdf). 
 10 This Note will not substantively address how race should factor into higher education ad-
missions, but will instead explore an alternative form of democratic decisionmaking that might 
prove beneficial in the context of higher education admissions policies. 
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bate have been reinforcing the significance of elections by developing 
and refining electoral mobilization and litigation strategies to fight or 
promote propositions or initiatives that ban affirmative action.  How-
ever, those organizations may better serve their goals not by focusing 
on improving their electoral or litigation campaigns, but rather by 
working toward a long-lasting solution based on informed and mea-
ningful discussions among stakeholders and members of the public.  
Building some type of a deliberative community provides a possible 
route to developing such a solution.  This type of community would 
enhance the deliberative ideals of face-to-face discussion, good public 
policy development, decisionmaking competence, and critical mass, 
making it a good candidate to supplement the ballot initiative pro- 
cess.  By establishing a deliberative community before a proposition  
vote, a broader segment of the population would be informed about  
the issue, would have discussions with others on the issue, and would  
come up with more comprehensive solutions regarding important so- 
cial concerns. 
In an attempt to enhance the democratic and deliberative capaci-
ties of the ballot initiative, Part I outlines a proposal for establishing 
citizens’ assemblies to develop and promote certain ballot initiatives.  
Part II utilizes core democratic and deliberative ideals to compare bal-
lot initiatives with the citizens’ assembly proposal.  Much like the tra-
ditional representative electoral process, ballot initiatives tend to have 
significant shortcomings when evaluated on the basis of deliberative 
principles.  Building on deliberative ideals through a citizens’ assembly 
helps to turn society into a learning community, which better prepares 
people to participate in a ballot initiative’s voting community.  Part II 
also addresses why referenda are not a good substitute for citizens’ as-
semblies as a supplement to ballot initiatives.  Using affirmative action 
as an example, Part III discusses more specifically how such a citizens’ 
assembly might be adopted and implemented prior to a ballot initia-
tive.  Beyond being superior to initiatives in the achievement of demo-
cratic and deliberative ideals, citizens’ assemblies may achieve im-
proved results for some controversial and technical issues. 
I.  CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLIES: AN ALTERNATIVE  
APPROACH TO BALLOT INITIATIVES 
Ballot initiatives were intended as an alternative to the flawed rep-
resentative, legislative system because such a system does not always 
give citizens sufficient control over their elected officials.  However, 
the best way to solve this problem is to supplement the electoral sys-
tem with other forms of citizen interaction that do not share the prob-
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lems inherent in aggregative voting.11  Groups should preempt the in-
itiative process by creating more inclusive and more educated delibera-
tive bodies in anticipation of ballot initiatives.  Even if implementing 
the proposed mechanism is not presently feasible in a particular state 
or for a particular issue, encouraging more deliberation than is encour-
aged in the current ballot initiative system would be a significant step 
in the right direction. 
A.  The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly 
This Note proposes that groups work with stakeholders and legisla-
tors to convene a citizens’ assembly largely modeled on the British Co-
lumbia Citizens’ Assembly (BCCA) and, in turn, that the assembly de-
velop language for some ballot initiatives.12  In response to a glaring 
disparity between the percentage of votes political parties garnered in 
the 1996 B.C. elections and the number of legislative seats the respec-
tive parties won,13 B.C. Premier Gordon Campbell supported creating 
a citizens’ assembly on electoral reform.14  To create the assembly, the 
B.C. government appointed an expert on Canadian governance to 
draft a report on convening such a group, and the B.C. Legislature 
unanimously approved the plan to convene the BCCA on Electoral 
Reform.15  The BCCA’s mandate was to “assess models for electing 
members of the [B.C.] Legislative Assembly and issue a report recom-
mending whether the current model for these elections should be re-
tained or another model should be adopted.”16  The plan stated that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 See Mansbridge, supra note 9, at 12–16 (discussing various methods to increase representa-
tives’ public interest motivation and responsiveness to public concerns, none of which involve the 
electoral system). 
 12 For a description of the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, see Lani Guinier, Beyond 
Electocracy: Rethinking the Political Representative as Powerful Stranger, 71 MOD. L. REV. 1, 
26–29 (2008). 
 13 In the 1996 B.C. elections, the New Democratic Party won the majority of seats despite 
winning a lower percentage of the vote (39%) than the British Columbia Liberal Party (42%).  
R.S. Ratner, British Columbia’s Citizens’ Assembly: The Learning Phase, CANADIAN PARLIA-
MENTARY REV., Summer 2004, at 20, 20; see also Amy Lang, But Is It for Real? The British Co-
lumbia Citizens’ Assembly as a Model of State-Sponsored Citizen Empowerment, 35 POL. & 
SOC’Y 35, 38 (2007).  The ratio of seats won to percentage of votes won was still distorted in the 
2001 election: the Liberal party won seventy-seven of the seventy-nine seats with only approx-
imately 57% of the votes.  Ratner, supra, at 20; see also Lang, supra, at 38. 
 14 R. Kenneth Carty, The Shifting Place of Political Parties in Canadian Public Life, IRPP 
CHOICES, June 2006, at 3, 3.  Premier Campbell had promised to institute such an entity after his 
previous electoral defeat.  Henry Milner, Electoral Reform and Deliberative Democracy in British 
Columbia, NAT’L CIVIC REV., Spring 2005, at 3, 4. 
 15 The legislature adopted the plan after making a few modifications to the report’s proposal.  
Ratner, supra note 13, at 20–21.  The expert who drafted the report was former politician Gordon 
Gibson.  Keith Archer, Redefining Electoral Democracy in Canada, 3 ELECTION L.J. 545, 556 
(2004). 
 16 Ratner, supra note 13, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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any resulting BCCA electoral reform proposal would be subjected to a 
popular vote.17  To pass, the referendum would need to win a double 
supermajority of votes: at least 60% of all voters and a simple majority 
of voters in 60% of the province’s seventy-nine districts.18 
When establishing the BCCA, Elections BC — a nonpartisan, in-
dependent office of the Legislature that is responsible for administer-
ing B.C. elections — randomly selected people from the voters list, 
sent over twenty thousand letters to solicit volunteers, and held meet-
ings to inform potential members of the assembly’s duties.19  Prior to 
sending out solicitation letters, Elections BC took steps to ensure age 
and gender diversity.20  To attract volunteers and to ensure that no 
additional hardship was placed on low-income assembly members, 
BCCA members received a stipend in addition to reimbursements for 
the costs of travel to and from meetings, childcare during meetings, 
and room and board during meetings.21  From the resulting volunteers, 
Elections BC randomly selected one man and one woman, both non-
officeholders, from each of British Columbia’s electoral districts.22  
The random process did not select any First Nations (native Canadian) 
people as BCCA members, but Elections BC added two First Nations 
people to the assembly before it was convened.23  Overall, racial and 
ethnic minorities, which comprise 22% of the general B.C. population, 
comprised 11% of the BCCA.24 
The BCCA’s process included a learning phase, a public hearings 
phase, and a deliberation phase.25  During the learning phase, BCCA 
members received reading materials from, and attended presentations 
by, experts on electoral systems in order to build a knowledge base 
among assembly members.26  Besides ensuring that each of the assem-
bly members was informed and became knowledgeable enough to en-
gage in deliberations and brainstorm about proposals, the learning 
phase put participants in a position to take the lead in the rest of the 
process.  Members also participated in group discussions and “devel-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Archer, supra note 15, at 556. 
 18 Id. 
 19 B.C. CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM, MAKING EVERY VOTE COUNT 
10 (2004) [hereinafter BCCA FINAL REPORT]. 
 20 Ratner, supra note 13, at 22. 
 21 See id. at 21–22.  These expenditures are likely essential to making the citizens’ assembly 
something in which a substantial number of people want to be involved, as opposed to a system 
like jury duty, which typically can only operate under a threat of penalty. 
 22 BCCA FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 10; Archer, supra note 15, at 556. 
 23 BCCA FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 10. 
 24 Lang, supra note 13, at 41. 
 25 BCCA FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 11–13. 
 26 See id. at 11.  The learning phase is one of the primary tools for ensuring that wealthier, 
more educated, or more politically active assembly members do not dominate the process. 
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op[ed] a set of Shared Values.”27  During the public hearings phase, 
BCCA members traveled to different electoral districts to hold fifty 
public hearings and to meet with community organizations.  Visitors to 
the BCCA website submitted over 1600 suggestions during this 
phase.28  In the deliberation phase, small groups prioritized values for 
selecting an electoral system, and then members designed two detailed 
electoral reform models during televised plenary sessions that were 
open to the public.29  BCCA members ultimately selected one model 
by a vote of 123–31.30 
Unfortunately, despite the year-long assembly process, there was lit-
tle public discussion regarding the upcoming BCCA referendum.31  In 
May 2005, the BCCA referendum won seventy-seven of seventy-nine 
districts but narrowly missed the supermajority of votes it needed to 
pass.32 
B.  Suggested Modifications to Citizens’ Assemblies 
While the BCCA provides the necessary groundwork for a citizens’ 
assembly, a series of modifications would likely increase an assembly 
system’s chances of adoption and success elsewhere.  For instance, rep-
licating the BCCA in other locations might require a strategy to per-
suade, or make an end-run around, less supportive elected officials and 
legislators.  New assemblies could also improve upon the inclusion of 
groups that were underrepresented in the BCCA and could establish a 
fourth phase to better promote the ballot initiative once the assembly 
has drafted the language. 
Although Premier Campbell was instrumental in establishing the 
BCCA, it is unlikely that such unique circumstances will regularly 
arise to prompt a governor and legislature to make a similar commit-
ment to establishing a citizens’ assembly.  Given that efforts to per-
suade officials to create a citizens’ assembly may encounter a number 
of the same difficulties as efforts to influence representative officials 
through traditional means, perhaps interested groups could secure gu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 12. 
 29 Id. at 13; Lang, supra note 13, at 46; Milner, supra note 14, at 6. 
 30 BCCA FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 13. 
 31 Prior to the referendum vote, approximately half of the electorate had not heard of the 
model, J.H. Snider, Solving a Classic Dilemma of Democratic Politics: Who Will Guard the Guar-
dians?, NAT’L CIVIC REV., Winter 2005, at 22, 25, and one-third had not even heard of the 
BCCA, Lang, supra note 13, at 36.  The lack of public awareness is unsurprising given that nei-
ther major political party took a position on the model, the assembly’s voter education budget 
was negligible, and the assembly disbanded five months prior to the election.  See Snider, supra, 
at 25. 
 32 The referendum received 57.4% of the overall vote, instead of the necessary 60%.  Snider, 
supra note 31, at 25. 
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bernatorial or legislative approval by scaling back the power of the cit-
izens’ assembly.33  If neither gubernatorial nor legislative approval is 
possible, then interested groups could collaborate to put an initiative 
creating a citizens’ assembly on the ballot or to create an unofficial cit-
izens’ assembly without government assistance, which would mean 
that the assembly would only be developing a proposal for a ballot in-
itiative and would not be guaranteed a spot on the ballot. 
While the BCCA did make some attempts at achieving an adequate 
representation of different groups, the process for selecting assembly 
members should ensure adequate racial, ethnic, and other types of re-
presentation in addition to adequate representation of different gend-
ers and ages.  A “critical mass”34 of representatives from different 
groups is required for deliberation to achieve legitimacy.35  To meet 
this goal, voter registration lists might be a good source of potential as-
sembly members; furthermore, having a period of targeted voter regis-
tration drives prior to assembly selection could make the lists more ac-
curate reflections of the population.  Additionally, after random 
selection from voter lists, a citizens’ assembly should have some me-
chanism to ensure adequate representation of various groups, possibly 
including different races, religions, and sexual orientations, prior to 
sending out letters to recruit potential volunteers.  Although it would 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 For instance, a governor or state legislature might be more likely to support the citizens’ 
assembly if the resulting initiative were subjected to the same (or stricter) procedural require-
ments for inclusion on the ballot and for passage as any other ballot initiative would be.  Depend-
ing on the state constitution, the governor or legislature might not have the power to permit ballot 
initiative language developed by a citizens’ assembly to be included on a ballot or adopted by 
procedures different from any other ballot initiative.  These states could either amend their consti-
tutions to allow for a full citizens’ assembly, or they could adopt a citizens’ assembly whose power 
is somewhat more limited than it would be in another state.  
 34 The scientific realm is the origin of the term “critical mass.”  Adeno Addis, The Concept of 
Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 97, 98 (2007).  In that area, the term re-
fers to the minimum level of fissionable material required to start and sustain a chain reaction 
that will lead to a nuclear explosion.  Id.  Critical mass describes three conditions:  
[T]he existence of a precise minimum level of the required material for a change to take 
place; a change that is sudden and transformative; and that the change is not simply a 
function of a minimum level of the resource but also a function of how elements of that 
resource interact with one another.   
Id. at 98–99.  The term is commonly used in social and legal arenas, sometimes to refer to “some 
threshold of participants . . . [that] has to be crossed before a social movement ‘explodes’ into be-
ing.”  Pamela Oliver, Gerald Marwell & Ruy Teixeira, A Theory of the Critical Mass (pt. I), 91 
AM. J. SOC. 522, 523 (1985).  For more discussion of the concept of critical mass, see infra section 
II.B.4, pp. 972–73. 
 35 See Michael Rabinder James, Descriptive Representation in the British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly, in DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CITI-
ZENS’ ASSEMBLY 106, 122 (Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse eds., 2008) [hereinafter DESIGN-
ING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY].  Achieving legitimacy entails more than just token repre-
sentation because a high degree of representativeness increases the public perception that a body 
is fair and legitimate.  Cf. ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 109 
(2004) (discussing the representativeness of juries). 
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be best to have a high level of representation across the board in a 
number of categories for every assembly, if there are limited time, re-
sources, and volunteers (as there typically are), decisions regarding 
which groups must be represented and at what levels should be tai-
lored to the issue of that particular assembly.  For instance, having 
adequate representation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered 
groups would likely be more important than that of some other groups 
for an assembly on same-sex marriage. 
In order to avoid results similar to the narrow defeat of the BCCA 
proposal, a citizens’ assembly should have a funded fourth phase: 
promoting the ballot initiative.  This phase should include the compo-
nents of a more traditional electoral campaign, such as voter registra-
tion, education, and mobilization.  The assembly plan should earmark 
funds for informational materials, educational meetings, and door-to-
door canvassing.  It might seem that there is not a need for public 
funding in this phase because interest groups will step in to campaign 
for or against the ballot initiative as they do in the current system.  Yet 
such strong interest group support is unlikely because either the ballot 
initiative proposed by the assembly will be a different or more mod-
erate initiative than partisan groups would support, or there will be a 
false sense that an initiative developed in such a legitimate process will 
win without any campaign.36  A citizens’ assembly with a funded vot-
er-education phase that includes debates and information sessions (and 
not just mass media soundbites) could help ensure that voters better 
understand the proposition and do not “vote in ways inconsistent with 
their preferences on the issue generally.”37 
II.  EVALUATIONS OF BALLOT INITIATIVES  
AND CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLIES 
Citizens’ assemblies may seem like an unnecessary supplement to 
initiatives, but the more deliberative process of assemblies offers im-
provements on initiatives in terms of both democratic and deliberative 
goals.  If one agrees that citizens’ assemblies would at least partially 
rectify ballot initiatives’ inability to fulfill democratic and deliberative 
ideals, replacing ballot initiatives with state referendum processes, in 
which the legislature develops language that is put to a popular vote, 
may seem to render citizens’ assemblies unnecessary.  It is unlikely, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 When voters are confused or unsure, they tend to support the status quo and would thus be 
less likely to vote in favor of such a referendum.  Snider, supra note 31, at 25. 
 37 LEIB, supra note 35, at 16–17 (quoting David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An As-
sessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 38 (1995)).  There is 
evidence that most voters “face an informational vacuum,” which might lead them to be suspi-
cious of a proposition and confused about what a yes or no vote would mean.  Id. at 16 (quoting 
Magleby, supra, at 38).  
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however, that states would supplant all ballot initiative processes with 
referenda.  Assuming, arguendo, that this were likely, citizens’ assem-
blies still have some advantages over referenda. 
A.  Democratic Ideals 
The necessary conditions for an ideal democratic system — which 
supporters of using ballot initiatives claim to be promoting — include 
participation, nontyranny, and political equality.38 
1.  Participation. — Significant involvement of the citizenry is one 
of the primary ideals of a democratic system.39  A lower level of partic-
ipation in a system results in a weaker mandate for the result of the 
system’s process.40  Judged under this participation ideal, ballot initia-
tives would seem to fare about the same as traditional electoral repre-
sentation.  For most propositions, the only structured citizen involve-
ment is the potential of casting a vote on election day.  There is little to 
no involvement before or after that moment of choice.  One participa-
tory aspect of ballot initiatives that is not a component of tradition- 
al representational politics is that all states require a certain percent- 
age of citizens to sign a petition before a proposition can be put on the  
ballot.41 
Establishing a citizens’ assembly before an initiative would signifi-
cantly increase the involvement of the public in decisionmaking.  The 
assembly members would draft the ballot initiative, the public hear-
ings phase would engage others who were interested, and, of course, 
voters would still be participating on election day.  Implementing a cit-
izens’ assembly would increase both the breadth and depth of partici-
pation in the decision, making the process substantially better in terms 
of participation than either traditional electoral representation or a 
ballot initiative alone. 
2.  Nontyranny. — A democratic process should protect minorities 
from a tyranny of the majority and minority alike.42  The process 
should, whenever possible, avoid “depriving any portion of the citi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 38 Although a number of scholars probably refer to different iterations of these principles, this 
Note draws upon Professor James Fishkin’s descriptions of these ideas.  See JAMES S. FISHKIN, 
DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 29–41 (1991); JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE 
PEOPLE 34 (1995). 
 39 See FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 38, at 34. 
 40 Id. at 45.   
 41 See RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN 
AMERICA 45 (2002).  The required percentage of signatures varies from 2% to 15% of the popula-
tion depending on the state.  Id. at 46. 
 42 The idea of tyranny discussed in this Note is not limited to minoritarianism, but is ex-
panded to also reference tyranny by a majority.  Additionally, the concept of nontyranny discussed 
here is aimed at reducing tyranny regardless of whether it is imposed on a majority or a minority. 
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zenry of rights or essential interests.”43  The existence of tyranny 
would call the legitimacy of the democratic process into question and 
would “invite[] resistance and protest rather than acceptance” of the 
process’s results.44 
Ballot initiative processes might provide racial, ethnic, and other 
minorities with inadequate protection from tyranny.45  A number of 
scholars claim that propositions negatively affect people of color and 
other minorities.46  In general, people of color are less likely to be on 
the winning side of propositions than are white people.47  This pheno-
menon is particularly true of ballot initiatives on explicitly racial is-
sues, such as affirmative action.48  Because propositions allow local 
communities to exercise their democratic right to repeal antidiscrimi-
nation laws, some commentators argue that minority groups should be 
entitled to special protection when their interests are threatened by a 
proposition.49  Unfortunately, courts cannot be relied on to adequately 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 38, at 34. 
 44 Id. at 50. 
 45 See, e.g., Zulmara Cline, Juan Necochea & Francisco Rios, The Tyranny of Democracy: De-
constructing the Passage of Racist Propositions, 3 J. LATINOS & EDUC. 67 (2004) (presenting a 
case study on California’s Proposition 227, which limited bilingual education).  In addition to 
bans on affirmative action, the ballot initiative process has been used to implement bans on same-
sex marriage.  Jennifer L. Levi, Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples: Where We Are and 
Where We Are Going, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 55 (2009). 
 46 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 7; Elizabeth R. Leong, Note, Ballot Initiatives & Identifiable Mi-
norities: A Textual Call to Congress, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 677 (1997).  According to Professor Derrick 
Bell, propositions are dangerous to the interests of people of color: “[T]he more direct democracy 
becomes, the more threatening it is” to black people.  Bell, supra note 7, at 1. 
 47 See Zoltan L. Hajnal, Elisabeth R. Gerber & Hugh Louch, Minorities and Direct Legisla-
tion: Evidence from California Ballot Proposition Elections, 64 J. POL. 154, 163 (2002).   
 48 See id. at 170 (stating that in every initiative the authors studied in this category, “the ma-
jority of white voters voted for the winning side of the initiative,” and “[i]n most cases, the majori-
ty of the voters from the three major racial/ethnic minority groups voted for the losing side”).  In a 
political science study of civil rights initiatives, Professor Barbara Gamble showed that of the se-
venty-four civil rights initiatives voted on by that time, 78% had resulted in “a defeat of minority 
interests.”  Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 
254 (1997).  Some may argue that recent events such as the election of President Obama show that 
people are no longer voting along racial lines.  Unfortunately, the 2008 election may not be as 
good a sign of racial progress as it might first appear.  There is still “persistent racial polarization 
in the Deep South and elsewhere,” Peter Wallsten & David G. Savage, Obama Win Used Against 
Rights Laws, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 2009, at 5, and significant differences continue to exist between 
whites and people of color in voting patterns.  Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles 
Stewart III, Race, Religion, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of 
the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2010).  In some states, President Ob-
ama won only one-tenth of the white vote — less than Senator John Kerry, the unsuccessful, 
white, Democratic nominee in 2004.  Wallsten & Savage, supra, at 5. 
 49 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 7; Leong, supra note 46 (arguing that Congress should protect 
identifiable minority groups from racially motivated ballot initiatives).  This concern is especially 
relevant in the area of affirmative action and racial protections because some argue that President 
Obama’s election “proves that some of the most protective civil rights laws can now be erased.”  
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“limit[] the ability of majority voters to disregard minority concerns,” 
perhaps because it is not always within courts’ power to do so.50 
A citizen’s assembly and the attendees at public hearings would al-
so serve as a check on majority rule through ballot initiatives, helping 
to ensure that the process and the result did not imperil the rights of 
minorities.  Instead of one interest group drafting a ballot initiative 
that serves its own needs, perhaps to the detriment of other groups, a 
broader group of people would be working together to reach a solution 
that best meets the needs of various groups.51 
3.  Political Equality. — That “citizens’ preferences count equally” 
is another key principle of a democratic system.52  In U.S. jurispru-
dence, this ideal is supposed to be embodied by the “one-person- 
one-vote” concept.53  While voting equality is important, it is but one 
of many components needed for political equality.54  Even if the politi-
cal process is designed to give each person’s preferences equal weight 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Wallsten & Savage, supra note 48.  To some, “Obama’s election heralds the emergence of a color-
blind society in which special legal safeguards for minorities are no longer required.”  Id. 
 50 Priscilla F. Gunn, Initiatives and Referendums: Direct Democracy and Minority Interests, 
22 URB. L. ANN. 135, 158 (1981).  Most ballot initiative systems place the responsibility for 
checking the majority will on the courts alone — “the least accountable branch,” and perhaps the 
branch most poorly suited to the task of “the more subtle screening and filtering of popular inter-
ests and passions that take place in the normal legislative process.”  ELLIS, supra note 41, at 176.  
Generally, state courts can strike down statutory initiatives on procedural grounds or on state and 
federal constitutional grounds.  However, for an initiative that changes the state constitution, 
courts typically only strike down the initiative on procedural or federal constitutional grounds 
because one state constitutional provision is not sufficient to render another unconstitutional. 
 51 This proposal is not meant to suggest that an assembly will always protect the rights or in-
terests of a minority.  For example, an assembly on an issue such as same-sex marriage, for which 
people’s opinions are largely influenced by religious beliefs, might still draft language limiting the 
rights of a minority. 
 52 FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 38, at 34; see also Patricia Gurin, Se-
lections from The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, Expert Reports in Defense 
of the University of Michigan, EQUITY & EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., September 1999, at 36, 40 
(1999) (noting that “equality among peers” is one of the “dimensions of develop[ing] the capacity 
for democracy”).  A more rigorous definition of political equality is that “every voter has an equal 
probability of being the decisive voter.”  FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION, supra 
note 38, at 31. 
 53 This principle was announced in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 54 As Professor Lani Guinier has pointed out, “one person, one vote” means very little for po-
litical equality when the people counted for redistricting are not necessarily even of voting age or 
eligible to vote and when the preferences of a number of voters are disregarded by the outcome in 
a winner-take-all electoral system.  See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S 
CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 179–82 
(2002); Guinier, supra note 12, at 11 n.46.  The ideal of political equality may be met by a measure 
as minimal as only allowing one vote per person instead of allowing for the “plural voting” that 
John Stuart Mill proposed.  FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 38, at 35 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  In Mill’s plural voting, certain people would have multiple votes to 
cast, perhaps because they have a higher level of education or some such factor, while others 
would have fewer votes or maybe just one vote to cast.  See id. 
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at the polls, there should be measures to make sure that other factors 
do not interfere with that equality.55 
Many are concerned that the initiative process — which involves 
expenses including paying signature-gatherers and paying for commer-
cials targeted at voters — is too easily captured by those with money 
and too exclusive of those without it.56  Wealthy interest groups can, 
and sometimes do, dominate the initiative process, and groups that 
lack substantial capital might be unable to participate fully.57  Much 
like the idea of the government providing funding for the campaigns 
of elected officials, government funding for the citizens’ assembly 
process would help to prevent the dominance of the preferences of the 
wealthy in the initiative process. 
B.  Deliberative Ideals 
Deliberation promotes a number of ideals that are usually neg-
lected, and thus undermined, by proposition processes.  The central 
principles of deliberation are especially relevant for important social 
decisions because they expand the pedagogical goal of diversity as a 
tool for better decisions in settings ranging from the formal classroom 
of a university to the larger society’s democracy.  Deliberative ideals 
include face-to-face discussion, the implementation of good public pol-
icy, decisionmaking competence, and critical mass. 
1.  Face-to-Face Discussion. — That citizens have face-to-face dis-
cussions about the issues up for decision is a key component of a de-
liberative system.58  The discussions should ideally be face to face in 
groups; although deliberation over the internet or engagement through 
phone conversations may be better than no discussion at all, those less 
personal forms of interaction are not substitutes for in-person interac-
tion.59  Deliberation makes people more informed and can also change 
people’s opinions.60  Additionally, deliberation encourages people to 
take more responsibility for solving social problems, and people find 
the discussion satisfying.61  Some have called for state-sponsored hear-
ings, debates, or caucuses prior to voting on ballot initiatives, but it 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 See FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION, supra note 38, at 30.  Such other fac-
tors include people’s votes being determined by bribes or threats instead of by their own prefe-
rences.  Id. at 32–33. 
 56 See ELLIS, supra note 41, at 44–45, 49–61. 
 57 Id. at 49–54; Henderson, supra note 7, at 965–70. 
 58 Gurin, supra note 52, at 40 (noting that “discussion under rules of civil discourse” is essential 
for “develop[ing] the capacity for democracy”).  Thomas Jefferson thought that the lack of popular 
deliberation required by the Constitution, outside of its own ratification process, was “the single 
greatest failing in the Founding design.”  ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 2, at 159. 
 59 See FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 38, at 34. 
 60 ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 2, at 52–54. 
 61 Id. at 59. 
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does not seem that any statewide initiative process requires such dia-
logue.  One of the most significant improvements a citizens’ assembly 
would provide is an increase in deliberation about the substance of a 
ballot initiative.  Not only would assembly members be involved in 
conversations, but the general public would also be included in the di-
alogue during the public hearings phase. 
2.  Implementation of Good Public Policy. — Deliberation increases 
our ability to “devis[e] and implement[] public policies that ground a 
productive economy and healthy society.”62  Deliberation does this by 
“enlarg[ing] the pools of ideas and information,” helping people sepa-
rate good arguments from bad ones, and “lead[ing] to a consensus on 
the ‘better’ or more ‘reasonable’ solution.”63  A deliberative process 
serves to aggregate different perspectives and to increase the decision-
making competence of the people involved.64  Many people deliberat-
ing over a decision may be more effective than a small number of 
people deliberating because having more people in a group generally 
leads to a higher “collective intelligence,” which is greater than the 
sum of its parts.65  Cognitive diversity — the idea that there are differ-
ences in how people in a group will approach a problem or a question 
— allows discussion in groups to increase and harness collective intel-
ligence.66  The optimal cognitive diversity of a group — meaning the 
ability to view the world from different perspectives67 — can only be 
attained by having multiple people involved in a discussion.68 
Ballot initiatives have few if any mechanisms to promote the crea-
tion of good public policy.  But through deliberation, BCCA partici-
pants gained a better understanding of the concerns facing a broader 
range of people and were thus able to design a redistricting process 
that better addressed more of those concerns.69  Citizens’ assemblies 
on other topics could potentially realize these same benefits. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 62 Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance, 
in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY 3, 3 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003).  Within this 
goal, this Note would also include the principle of “assuring that all citizens benefit from the na-
tion’s wealth.”  Id. 
 63 Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: The Mechanisms of Collective Intelligence in Poli-
tics 8 (May 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 64 Id. at 5–6. 
 65 Id. at 3–4. 
 66 See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES 
BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007). 
 67 See id. at 23–51. 
 68 Landemore, supra note 63, at 3–4. 
 69 For instance, one participant learned about the problems facing people in rural districts.  
Guinier, supra note 12, at 28.  Assembly members learned that voters wanted “more nuanced re-
presentation[].”  Id. (quoting interview by Lani Guinier with Shoni Field, Former Member, B.C. 
Citizens’ Assembly (Nov. 2, 2006)). 
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3.  Decisionmaking Competence. — The people participating in a 
democratic process should have the information and skills necessary to 
make a meaningful decision.  Making a thoughtful decision often re-
quires background information on a policy area or a candidate.  For 
drafting legislation or constitutional amendments, competence requires 
that the drafters write in a way that will allow the legislation or 
amendment, if passed, to achieve its purpose. 
Laws passed through the initiative process are often poorly drafted 
and difficult to interpret.70  In these situations, the electorate is fre-
quently misled and unprepared to make wise choices.71  The educa-
tion, public opinion–gathering, and promoting-the-ballot-initiative 
phases of the citizens’ assembly would ensure that the decisionmaking 
competence of the drafters and the voters is much higher than it has 
been in other ballot initiatives. 
4.  Critical Mass. — The concept of critical mass refers to an unde-
fined number or percentage of people, specifically of a historically un-
derrepresented group or a racial minority, whose participation is nec-
essary to maximize the learning and level of thought taking place  
in a group discussion.  In the affirmative action debate, the concept  
of critical mass was popularized by the Expert Report of Patricia  
Gurin,72 which the University of Michigan Law School employed to 
successfully defend the use of race as a factor in admissions in Grutter 
v. Bollinger.73 
Although the concept of critical mass did not arise out of a discus-
sion of democratic processes, the concept’s usefulness extends to demo-
cratic systems.  Having a critical mass of students of color at the Uni-
versity of Michigan “prepare[d] young people for active participation 
in our democratic society.”74  Gurin’s report showed that “[s]tudents 
learn more and think in deeper, more complex ways in diverse educa-
tional environments.”75  The presence of a critical mass of students of 
color at the University of Michigan “create[d] the discrepancy, discon-
tinuity, and disequilibrium” that foster better learning.76  In Gurin’s 
study, “[s]tudents who had experienced the most diversity . . . showed 
the greatest engagement in active thinking processes, growth in intel-
lectual engagement and motivation, and growth in intellectual and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 70 See Henderson, supra note 7, at 978–79. 
 71 Id. at 981–83; cf. Mansbridge, supra note 9, at 4 (noting that electoral campaigns are “poor 
sources of information” and often “distort information”).   
 72 See Gurin, supra note 52. 
 73 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s use of race as a 
factor in admissions). 
 74 Gurin, supra note 52, at 36. 
 75 Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted). 
 76 Id. at 39. 
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academic skills.”77  If a critical mass of assembly members are people 
of color, the assembly could also tap into some of these benefits, pro-
ducing assembly members better prepared to engage in democratic so-
ciety, learn and think in complex ways, and think creatively about 
solving problems.  Perhaps these benefits could also extend to voters, 
and diversity could serve to disrupt the more automatic thinking with 
which many voters might otherwise approach learning or problem 
solving.78  These benefits of critical mass are not necessarily limited to 
racial representation; “members of heterogeneous working groups offer 
more creative solutions to problems than those in homogenous groups” 
and also “show greater potential for critical thinking.”79 
Inclusion of many representatives of all potential groups may be 
neither necessary nor possible in an assembly due to a very low num-
ber of group members in a geographic area or perhaps because most 
members of a group have little or no interest in the topic at issue.  
However, lacking a critical mass for a group that is a substantial per-
centage of the population in an area or for a group that has a signifi-
cant stake in the assembly topic would pose serious problems for an 
assembly as a democratic process.  The concerns and ideas of people 
left out would not be added to the discussion,80 nor would these people 
necessarily feel that they were a part of the community of consent that 
made the decision. 
The selection process for the citizens’ assembly members would at-
tempt to include critical masses of different underrepresented social 
groups within the decisionmaking process in a way that no other legis-
lation-drafting process does.  The BCCA illustrates that diversity 
measures beyond random selection are likely necessary to ensure that a 
critical mass of key underrepresented groups participates.81  By con-
trast, general elections and ballot initiative votes obviously include no 
mechanisms to ensure a critical mass of any particular group.82 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 77 Id. at 45.  Although diversity has a positive impact on black and Latino students, “[t]he re-
sults are especially impressive for [w]hite students,” and the learning outcomes “persisted across 
time.”  Id.  It is not diversity alone that promotes active thinking in white students, but rather 
“the quality of cross-racial interaction.”  Id. at 46.   
 78 Cf. id. at 38–39 (discussing this phenomenon in the university setting).  
 79 Id. at 39. 
 80 See FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 38, at 37–38. 
 81 Two First Nations people out of 161 assembly members is likely not a critical mass, but in 
trying to achieve diversity, the BCCA moved closer to achieving critical mass than a ballot initia-
tive vote would have. 
 82 Critical mass requires not only the presence of a significant number or percentage of a 
group in a process, but also substantive interaction between individual members of different 
groups.  Thus, even if a significant percentage or number of various underrepresented groups vote 
on a proposition on election day, the ballot initiative process would still not necessarily meet this 
higher standard of diversity. 
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C.  Referenda and Citizens’ Assemblies 
The availability of state referenda, or legislature-developed meas-
ures put to popular vote, may seem to present an alternative to ballot 
initiatives that renders citizens’ assemblies unnecessary.  Referenda do 
avoid some of the pitfalls of ballot initiatives and still allow a broad 
range of participation in legislative decisions.  However, the cultural 
narrative that democracy requires an avenue for everyday people to 
directly develop and vote on legislation83 does not allow referenda to 
fully replace ballot initiatives, leaving some ballot initiatives that citi-
zens’ assemblies could supplement.  Moreover, even if it were feasible 
for referenda to replace ballot initiatives, citizens’ assemblies still have 
some benefits that are absent from the state referendum process. 
In addition to or instead of ballot propositions, some states have a 
referendum process,84 which is comparable to a ballot initiative 
process in terms of achieving the democratic ideals of participation 
and political equality because both systems depend almost wholly on 
voting on election day to fulfill those criteria.  However, referenda may 
fare better than ballot initiatives in terms of nontyranny.  Elected offi-
cials, up for reelection at some point, could be more easily held ac-
countable for drafting a measure that subordinates the interests of a 
majority or a minority group than a special interest group could be, as 
special interests are only accountable to their funders or members.  
When evaluated on the basis of deliberative ideals, referenda are com-
parable to ballot initiatives in achieving face-to-face discussion and 
critical mass, again because both mechanisms turn on elections, but  
referenda are likely better than ballot initiatives for implementing 
good public policy and for maximizing decisionmaking competence.85 
These comparative strengths of referenda might suggest that ref-
erenda should replace ballot initiatives.  However, ballot initiatives are 
by no means at risk of extinction, and it is unlikely that such a cam-
paign would be successful.  Despite the criticisms of ballot initiatives 
and the existence of referenda as an alternative, most states have not 
significantly curtailed their use of ballot initiatives.86  Instead, the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 83 See supra p. 959. 
 84 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 2–4.  Beyond making this referendum process availa-
ble, California goes so far as to “prohibit[] its Legislature from amending or repealing many types 
of laws without voter approval.”  Jennifer Steinhauer, Lead Judge Denounces State’s Glut of 
Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at A23 (paraphrasing the statement of Ronald M. George, 
Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court). 
 85 Because crafting social policy is supposed to be part of a legislator’s expertise and job, and 
also because legislators can be held accountable upon reelection for supporting bad policies, ref-
erenda seem more likely to result in good public policy and more decisionmaking competence 
than a ballot initiative system in the hands of largely unaccountable special interest groups. 
 86 See Initiative & Referendum Inst., Univ. of S. Cal., A Brief the [sic] History of the Initiative 
and Referendum Process in the United States, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New IRI Website 
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number of initiatives reached an all-time high in the last decade.87  
Thus, states will likely still need the citizens’ assembly as a partial so-
lution to some of the shortcomings of ballot propositions. 
Even if it were feasible for referenda or state constitutional conven-
tions to completely replace ballot initiative systems, it would still be 
desirable to have citizens’ assemblies develop some initiatives for pop-
ular vote, instead of limiting that ability to legislators.  While a state 
constitutional convention is more similar to the citizens’ assembly ap-
proach than is a ballot initiative vote alone (because the referenda 
would entail some popular deliberation), there are still significant ad-
vantages to a citizens’ assembly.  For referenda, the drafting of ref-
erendum language is limited to members of the state legislature, and a 
vote of the state legislature is necessary for the language to appear on 
the ballot.  This requirement limits the choices available to citizens, 
who may then doubt whether the legislature has developed the initia-
tive in the way they would most support.88  Additionally, assembly 
members would be able to suggest the best solution without the influ-
ence of reelection pressures, and they would likely face less pressure 
from special interests than would elected officials since assembly 
members are not repeat players.  Because citizens’ assemblies would 
be very costly and time-consuming, however, it is understandable that 
not every ballot initiative would have an accompanying assembly.  
Thus, referenda could still provide an alternative to ballot initiatives 
in some situations.89   
Although citizens’ assemblies and constitutional conventions share 
a number of similarities, citizens’ assemblies would provide benefits 
that state constitutional conventions lack because the convention par-
ticipants are not necessarily selected randomly or in a way that ensures 
inclusion of critical masses of relevant groups.  Additionally, state con-
stitutional conventions do not necessarily entail the education of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Info/Drop Down Boxes/Quick Facts/History of I&R.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).  For instance, 
the Colorado November 2008 ballot was comprised of fourteen ballot initiatives, including ten 
constitutional amendments.  Valerie Richardson, Obama Helped Defeat Anti–Affirmative Action, 
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at A02. 
 87 Id.  Although the majority of the initiatives occur in only six states — Arizona, California, 
Colorado, North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington — twenty-four states have an initiative 
process.  Id. 
 88 See Dennis F. Thompson, Who Should Govern Who Governs? The Role of Citizens in Re-
forming the Electoral System, in DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 
20, 28–29 (noting that such considerations “suggest that we should supplement the [ballot initia-
tive], not with a royal commission, but with a process that gives ordinary citizens an opportunity 
to formulate the propositions,” id. at 29). 
 89 Not all proposals for deliberative bodies make allowances for the referendum or initiative 
processes to coexist.  See, e.g., LEIB, supra note 35, at 12 (stating that the deliberative proposal 
would replace initiatives and referenda). 
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assembly members or a public opinion–gathering phase before the 
convention that would develop a proposal.   
III.  APPLICATION OF CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLIES  
TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
A.  Evaluation of Anti–Affirmative Action Ballot Initiatives 
The BCCA was established to deal with the highly controversial 
and technical issue of electoral reform.  Establishing citizens’ assem-
blies may also be feasible and successful for ballot initiatives regarding 
other controversial social issues, specifically those that impact the in-
terests of social minorities.  These types of issues (such as affirmative 
action or same-sex marriage) can pose significant risks of tyranny of 
the majority because such issues are often ones that involve minority 
rights or minority views.  Although the controversial nature of the is-
sues means that assembly members may be more polarized, the dan-
gers posed by a direct democratic vote are also particularly high — 
perhaps making the case for a citizens’ assembly even stronger in such 
situations. 
Ballot initiatives have likely become the primary arena for making 
decisions regarding race as a factor in higher education admissions.90  
Unfortunately, the shortcomings of the ballot initiative process in ful-
filling democratic and deliberative ideals have also plagued initiatives 
to ban affirmative action.  From 1996 to the present, five states have 
held statewide votes on propositions to end affirmative action in high-
er education, four of which have passed.  Although the state context, 
demographics, and election results have differed,91 each initiative 
largely failed to promote democratic or deliberative goals. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 90 Although anti–affirmative action groups have employed judicial and legislative strategies, 
those efforts have not been as successful as the proposition approach.  In the two years following 
the passage of anti–affirmative action Proposition 209 in California, thirteen states considered 
bills to eliminate affirmative action, but none of the states enacted the bills.  Jodi Miller, “Democ-
racy in Free Fall”: The Use of Ballot Initiatives To Dismantle State-Sponsored Affirmative Action 
Programs, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 9 (citing S. Reg’l Council, Seeking an America as Good as 
Its Promise: Remedies for Racial Inequality: The Public’s Views, S. CHANGES, Winter 1998, at 8, 
10).  
  Some anti–affirmative action activists have used President Obama’s election as an added 
argument for the elimination of affirmative action programs.  Ward Connerly, speaking about 
President Obama’s inauguration, said, “We are here in the nation’s capital a few days before an 
event that will demonstrate something most of us in this room have always believed: that America 
is a fair country and that the colorblind vision works.”  Cathy Young, Obama May Boost Foes of 
Affirmative Action, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91 Initiatives to ban the use of race in admissions were voted on in California in 1996, Wash-
ington in 1998, Michigan in 2006, and both Colorado and Nebraska in 2008.  All but the Colorado 
initiative passed.  Not all efforts to get anti–affirmative action initiatives on the ballot have been 
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In terms of face-to-face discussion and critical mass, none of the 
anti–affirmative action ballot initiatives fared any better than a tradi-
tional election or ballot initiative would have.92  Unfortunately, when 
analyzed on the basis of participation, nontyranny, political equality, 
and decisionmaking competence, anti–affirmative action ballot initia-
tives are probably worse than traditional elections or other ballot in-
itiatives.  Participation in the initiatives was even more narrow than 
other ballot initiatives because many of the same proponents pushed 
for the initiatives in each state (Ward Connerly being the most promi-
nent).93  Additionally, if using race as a factor in college admissions 
and hiring is necessary to ensure equal opportunity to some groups or 
to avoid denying them their civil rights, then as a democratic process, 
the ballot initiative process would not have fulfilled the ideal of non-
tyranny in the states where anti–affirmative action bans have passed.  
Without any requirement of a supermajority or other similar mechan-
ism, a popular vote on an affirmative action ban is likely to involve a 
high risk of tyranny of the majority.     
In terms of political equality, the confusing and misleading lan-
guage of the initiatives resulted in votes that may not have reflected 
voters’ true preferences.  The language of each ballot initiative was 
completely or very nearly the same — none of the initiatives men-
tioned affirmative action by name, nor did they state that a “yes” vote 
would eliminate affirmative action.94  Instead, the initiatives had 
names such as the “California Civil Rights Initiative” and associated 
themselves with Martin Luther King, Jr. and the civil rights move-
ment, which may have misled some voters into thinking that a “yes” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
successful.  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 90, at 9 (noting failed attempts in Florida, Michigan, Ohio, 
and Arizona). 
 92 There may be resistance to ensuring that a citizens’ assembly includes critical masses of dif-
ferent groups.  However, an issue such as affirmative action is illustrative of how a homogenous 
citizens’ assembly would suffer because it would lack the cognitive diversity and creative prob-
lem-solving ideas that are essential for its success.  If the assembly does not have critical masses of 
key groups, the results might be in some ways worse than a ballot initiative alone because being a 
citizens’ assembly in name may give it the appearance of legitimacy without having interested 
groups included in the deliberations or harnessing the collective intelligence necessary for making 
better decisions.  For groups whose interests are at stake, “virtual representation is usually not 
regarded as sufficient by those who are virtually represented.”  Thompson, supra note 88, at 43.  
Furthermore, concerns about using race as a factor in university admissions (which are at least 
somewhat merit-based) should not apply to the random selection of a group of citizens that is in-
tended to be representative of the population and not chosen for capabilities or skills. 
 93 See Miller, supra note 90, at 10; Melissa Lee, Affirmative-Action Ban Passes by Wide Mar-
gin, LINCOLN J. STAR, Nov. 3, 2008, available at http://www.journalstar.com (search for “affir-
mative-action ban passes”; then follow second hyperlink to article); Henry Payne, Prop 2: A Les-
son for Republicans, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Nov. 9, 2006, http://www.nationalreview.com (search 
“National Review Online” for “Prop 2 A Lesson for Republicans”; then follow hyperlink to the 
article). 
 94 Miller, supra note 90, at 26–27.   
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vote would protect affirmative action.95  A number of voters in Cali-
fornia were confused about the meaning of the initiative.96  The initia-
tive language is significant because “while the general public is adverse 
to ‘preferences’ and ‘quotas,’ it generally supports affirmative ac-
tion.”97  Part of the California ballot initiative asked, “Shall govern-
ment entities be prohibited from discriminating . . . based on race, sex, 
color, ethnicity, or national origin . . . ?”98  Requiring some sort of del-
iberation on the affirmative action bans would likely have improved 
voters’ understanding of what voting “yes” or “no” on the initiative 
would mean. 
In terms of decisionmaking competence, because a number of vot-
ers did not understand the implications of the anti–affirmative action 
ballot initiatives, they did not have the information necessary to make 
an informed decision regarding their vote on the initiative or their sig-
nature on the initiative petition.  Furthermore, if most voters in a state 
did not understand how race or gender factored into admissions and 
hiring decisions or the demographics of those admitted or hired, that 
would show a lower level of decisionmaking competence.  Additional-
ly, without a supplemental institution such as an assembly, the emo-
tionally charged atmosphere of propositions on affirmative action may 
have led voters to take less care in understanding and thinking about 
the matter.99 
Of all the democratic and deliberative goals, the affirmative action 
ballot initiatives perhaps fare the worst with the ideal of implementing 
good public policy.  The binary tool of the electoral process makes it 
“an extremely blunt instrument,”100 so voting itself, without additional 
supplementary measures, may not be a method suitable for making a 
meaningful decision regarding race as a factor in higher admissions.  
The ballot initiative process allowed a special interest group with an 
extreme view to title and word ballot initiatives misleadingly in nu-
merous states, such that some would argue the initiatives seemed to 
voters that they would have the opposite effect of their actual intended 
goal.  Having a large number of knowledgeable, randomly selected cit-
izens draft the initiative language would serve as a check so that there 
is a good faith effort to make the initiative easily understood by other 
ordinary citizens, and so that votes more accurately match the prefe-
rences of the people who cast them. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 95 See LYDIA CHÁVEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA’S BATTLE TO END AFFIRMA-
TIVE ACTION 218–19 (1998); Miller, supra note 90, at 30.   
 96 CHÁVEZ, supra note 95, at 246–47. 
 97 Miller, supra note 90, at 26. 
 98 Id. at 10 n.66 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 99 See Bell, supra note 7, at 12. 
 100 Mansbridge, supra note 9, at 4. 
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B.  Feasibility and Potential Success  
of a Citizens’ Assembly on Affirmative Action 
One concern about the results of a citizens’ assembly for a contro-
versial issue such as affirmative action is the possibility that many 
people’s opinions are based on principle and not on ignorance; so edu-
cation, opinion gathering, and deliberation may have only a negligible 
impact on the outcome.  However, there is much that people do not 
know about how race is and is not used as a factor in different admis-
sions systems and about other people’s life experiences; gaining this in-
formation through a citizens’ assembly makes it possible that a per-
son’s opinion may change.101  Even if a person opposed a specific 
mode of using race as a factor (such as a quota), he or she may not 
necessarily oppose all uses of race.  Assembly members may come in 
with a wide variety of opinions on the way in which race is being used 
in admissions and they, like the dissatisfied citizens of the BCCA, may 
still be able to reach a compromise.102  It is likely that opinions will 
change and that a better decision will be reached through delibera-
tion.103  But even if the outcome of the initiative would be the same, 
the act of deliberating with a diverse group of people such as a citi-
zens’ assembly provides a democratic and social benefit to the individ-
uals involved and to society at large.   
To decrease the possibility that assembly members with extreme 
views could make the resulting initiative language just as misleading 
as it might have been without an assembly process, perhaps a super-
majority of assembly members should be required to put any language 
on the ballot.104  Additionally, the process of deliberation with a group 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 101 University admissions systems are complicated and there are a number of ways in which 
race can be used as a factor in admissions.  Many people could have different reactions to affirma-
tive action based on how race is considered.  The types of affirmative action that a person would 
oppose may not even be in use. 
 102 See André Blais, R. Kenneth Carty & Patrick Fournier, Do Citizens’ Assemblies Make Rea-
soned Choices?, in DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 127, 130–31 
(noting that sixty-four percent of assembly members were dissatisfied with the electoral system 
and that the majority of members would propose a new system if it fit their values).  Some mod-
erate and improved policies that a citizens’ assembly is more likely to propose than is a ballot in-
itiative alone would include: specifying that race could be used as one factor among many in ad-
missions but that it could not be a deciding factor; clarifying that regardless of any decision on 
whether race could or could not be used as a factor in admissions, the university could still recruit 
underrepresented groups; allowing the university to still sponsor or administer scholarships tar-
geted at specific groups; and deciding that the university could still maintain services that were 
targeted at specific groups, such as a women’s center. 
 103 See supra p. 971. 
 104 Although this did not seem to be a problem with the BCCA (its internal votes only required 
a simple majority, Thompson, supra note 88, at 39), this issue could arise with other controversial 
issues.  A supermajority requirement would also help to “build in an acknowledgement of the 
sheer power of the institution,” LEIB, supra note 35, at 83, and to ensure that members are mak-
ing good faith attempts to discuss the issue and reach a reasonable compromise.  This way citi-
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of diverse people helps to move views toward meeting a common 
goal.105  Publicizing parts of the process serves as another check on the 
possibility of a member trying to hold up the process because the pub-
lic would be able to “see how their fellow citizens are doing their jobs 
as citizens.”106 
CONCLUSION 
Although ballot initiatives were intended to alleviate the problems 
posed by electing representatives, they often compound those problems 
because proposition systems merely “refine” elections, inherently 
flawed machinery, instead of developing a communicative process that 
goes beyond the capacity of elections.  In presenting an idea so differ-
ent from the current ballot initiative process, this Note is not meant to 
imply that developing and implementing a citizens’ assembly would be 
without political or practical obstacles.  Those difficulties notwith-
standing, the bounds that restrict the current defective system should 
not similarly restrict ideas of what an ideal decisionmaking system 
would be.  To do so would limit the potential to improve upon ballot 
initiative voting in much the same way as ballot initiatives are a lim-
ited improvement upon the system of representative politics.  Having 
an eventual goal of ensuring that a large, representative group of 
people deliberates and develops a proposal for the ballot after becom-
ing informed on the issue and consulting the general public should not 
seem such a radical notion in a democratic society.  That this proposal 
may seem radical is perhaps the best evidence that voters should be 
debating this proposal and others like it that supplement the current 
electoral system.  The goal of this Note is not to encourage organiza-
tions to ignore ballot initiatives should they arise.  The goal is instead 
to prompt organizations to engage these issues even earlier, on a deeper 
level, with a broader focus, and with more stakeholders at the table.  
The choice of strategies on affirmative action and other social issues 
should be varied and more sophisticated, not just as binary as the yes-
no, up-down vote on the proposition itself.  The final tally on a ballot 
initiative is not all that matters.  Regardless of the vote count, stake-
holders need to imagine and attempt to implement processes that ad-
dress shortcomings in the electoral system instead of intensifying the 
very problems that ballot initiatives and affirmative action were in-
tended to remedy. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
zens’ assemblies will be less likely to be used in situations where a narrow majority might impose 
its will on others. 
 105 See supra pp. 970–71.   
 106 LEIB, supra note 35, at 78. 
